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Introduction
The efficiency of monetary policy crucially depends on the central bank's expectations management (see Blinder et al., 2008) . The growing literature on central bank communication suggests that publication of interest rate projections can be a powerful tool for both explaining monetary policy and guiding market expectations (see, e.g., Rudebusch and Williams, 2008) . The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) was the first central bank to publish projections of the future 90-day bank bill rate so as to guide interest rate expectations up to three years in the future. The information content of central bank interest rate projections is typically investigated in event studies that focus on the projection's impact on market rates at or close to the announcement day (see Moessner and Nelson, 2008; Ferrero and Secchi, 2009; Detmers and Nautz, 2012; Moessner, 2013; Winkelmann, 2013) . However, the RBNZ's projections are published and updated only quarterly . 1 There continues to be debate over the utility of regularly announced interest rate projections for central bank communication. Goodhart and Wen (2011) conclude from a forecast analysis that the RBNZ's interest rate projections are useless for a horizon of more than two quarters ahead. According to Neuenkirch (2012) , publication of interest rate projections contributes to a high transparency index of the RBNZ which is found to reduce the bias and variation of expectations. However, none of these contributions consider the time-varying information content of interest rate projections. Therefore, our paper is most closely related to Ehrmann and Sondermann (2012) , who investigate the time-varying news content of the quarterly Bank of England Inflation Report. They find that interest rate uncertainty rises over time until the central bank updates its communication.
Following Ehrmann and Sondermann (2012) , we explore the impact of interest rate projections on interest rate uncertainty within an EGARCH framework for daily changes in market interest rates of various maturities. In our application, the relevant market rate is the futures rate whose maturity exactly matches the rate projected by the central bank. The spread between these interest rates reveals the extent to which market expectations continue to rely on the projection. Specifically, large spreads indicate that the projection has become stale. The empirical model is used to test two hypotheses on the time-and state-dependent impact of interest rate projections on market expectations.
Hypothesis 1 is that interest rate uncertainty increases between two releases of central bank projections. According to Hypothesis 2, large spreads implying stale projections contribute to higher interest rate uncertainty. In particular, the uncertainty-increasing impact of stale projections becomes stronger the longer markets have to wait for an updated projection.
Both hypotheses on the time-and state-dependent impact of central bank projections on interest rate uncertainty are confirmed by the data. Our empirical results therefore suggest that the efficiency of interest rate projections could be improved by the central bank along two dimensions. First, projections would be more useful if they were updated more frequently. Second, the central bank should update its projection whenever markets perceive the current projection to be stale. In fact, counterfactual analysis suggests that the performance of the RBNZ's projections could improve significantly by using a more flexible, state-dependent implementation scheme that ensures a certain freshness of the projections.
3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the RBNZ's interest rate projections and the data. Section 3 discusses the volatility effects of stale projections. Section 4 introduces the econometric model and the estimation results.
Section 5 provides a counterfactual analysis of alternative implementation schemes for interest rate projections. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
2 The Interest Rate Projections of the RBNZ and Market Expectations Detmers and Nautz (2012) Since 1997, the RBNZ has been projecting the 90-day bank bill rate for the following 8 to 12 quarters. These projections are published quarterly in the RBNZ's Monetary Policy Statement (MPS). 2 Figure 1 shows that interest rate projections change substantially from one release to the next, a first clue that projections lose much of their relevance over the course of a quarter.
We use daily futures rates on the 90-day bank bill rate as a proxy for prevailing market expectations about future interest rates and derive f j t as the market expectation of the 90-day rate j quarters ahead. We restrict the empirical analysis to j = 1, . . . , 5 since data for longer-term futures rates are available only from 2007 onward. Taking For each maturity, the sizable difference between the mean and the median of the absolute deviation between futures rates and the corresponding interest rate projections indicate the presence of outliers (see Table 1 and Figure 3 bank interest rate projection, at least shortly after the release of a new interest rate path.
However, over time, market expectations often start to deviate from the central bank projection, implying that its information content has decreased. Since the degree of its staleness is not clear, markets are confronted with a signal-extraction problem. In this section, we propose two testable hypotheses about the volatility effects of stale interest rate projections.
Hypothesis 1 Interest rate uncertainty rises between two interest rate projections.
When the most recent projection ages, markets cannot be sure of its continuing relevance, especially since the central bank does not comment on the projection once it has been published. Therefore, regardless of expectations prevalent in the market, the information content of a projection declines over time, implying increasing interest rate uncertainty until the new projection is published. (2012), we model the daily change in expectations by
Hypothesis 2
where X t represents a vector of control variables, including the surprise component of a newly announced central bank projection, U.S. interest rates, the effective exchange rate, and an economic surprise index for New Zealand. 4
For each j = 1, . . . , 5, the conditional variance of the futures rate is assumed to follow an augmented EGARCH(1,1) model:
where Z t represents a vector of dummies controlling for monetary policy days. The variable τ t measures the time elapsed since the last release of an interest rate projection. Specifically, we calculate 0 ≤ τ t ≤ 1 as the number of days since the last release divided by the total number of days between the preceding and the subsequent release of RBNZ's interest rate projections. Thus, τ t equals 0 on the announcement day and 1 on the day before the subsequent announcement. In a scenario with τ t ≡ 0, staleness of projections is not an issue because the current projection is always new. In contrast, τ t ≡ 1 could be interpreted as a scenario in which the information content of projections is always negligible. In line with Hypothesis 1, in both periods interest rate uncertainty typically increases with time elapsing since the most recent published projection (ρ j τ > 0). The only exception is the insignificant estimate of ρ 5 τ = −0.01 obtained for the pre-crisis period. In all other cases, an aging projection induces higher market uncertainty. Put differently, this effect confirms the usefulness of projections, since volatility is lower when the pro-9 jection was recently announced. While a significant time dependence is found only for short maturities up to three quarters in the pre-crisis period, this effect is highly significant for all maturities in the crisis period. This may indicate that the information content of longer-term projections was limited until September 2008. Since the crisis, however, newly announced interest rate projections dampen even the volatility of longer-term futures rates.
Confirming Hypothesis 2, we find a significant state-dependent effect (ρ j s > 0) of projections on interest rate volatility. When interest rate expectations increasingly deviate from the corresponding interest rate projection, their information content declines and interest rate uncertainty rises. However, this effect shrinks over time, i.e. when the projection becomes older. Apparently, markets understand that with increasing age of the recent projection, deviations from it matter less. Large spreads between market expectations and interest rate projections at the end of a quarter induce less market uncertainty than occurs a few days after a new publication. For both sample periods, the strength of the state-dependent effect declines with the horizon j, suggesting that the information content of projections is higher for short maturities. Note that the size of the state-dependent coefficients is not easily comparable across sample periods. Specifically, the smaller coefficients estimated for the crisis period do not necessarily imply less state-dependence since the deviations between futures rates and the central bank projections are typically more pronounced in the aftermath of the Lehman failure.
The estimation results suggest that central bank interest rate projections are a powerful tool for guiding market expectations, but they could be used more efficiently. First, interest rate projections could be provided more frequently instead of only quarterly, with daily updated projections as a limiting case. Alternatively, the central bank could update its projections whenever current events cast doubt on the information content and validity of the extant projection. Once market expectations and central bank projections diverge too far, the central bank could adjust its projection (if the bank follows market expectations) or reestablish the validity of the current projection (if market expectations were incorrect). In any case, the difference between market expectations and the central bank projection (| f − p|) should decline.
Counterfactual Analysis of Alternative Projection Implementation Schemes
The results presented in Section 4 suggest that the central bank could lower interest rate uncertainty by maintaining the freshness of projections. In this section, we propose a counterfactual analysis in order to evaluate the volatility effects of alternative implementation schemes for central bank projections. To that end, consider the following implementation schemes:
(1) Projections with daily update: The central bank announces its interest rate projections on a daily basis. Accordingly, staleness of projections is not an issue and market expectations should be in line with projections. In the counterfactual analysis, this scenario implies that | f j − p j | ≡ 0 and τ t ≡ 0.
(2) No projections: As a further limiting case, suppose that the central bank provides no interest rate projections. In this case, we assume that τ t ≡ 1 and projections have no impact on interest rate volatility.
(3) Projections with state-dependent update: The central bank announces a new projection (or reinforces the current one) whenever | f j − p j | rises above a certain threshold, e.g. 12.5 basis points. In this scenario, market expectations should be constrained by a band of 25 basis points around the projection. In the counterfactual analysis, this implementation scheme implies that | f j − p j | ≤ 12.5. Since the central bank is paying constant attention to when the projection needs to be updated, time-varying effects of projections on interest rate uncertainty should be negligible, i.e. τ t ≡ 0.
The counterfactual volatilities for the above three schemes are based on the normalized residuals of the EGARCH models estimated for each maturity and sample period.
We obtain the counterfactual conditional volatility σ 2,j t via a dynamic simulation of the estimated variance equation:
Depending on the implementation scheme, we replace the original τ t that ranges be- each alternative implementation scheme and give an idea of the enhancement potential of modifying the implementation schedule. The second row implies that this gainreflected in the difference between volatilities obtained for projections with quarterly and daily updates -has remarkably increased both in absolute and relative terms since the outbreak of the crisis. 5
Counterfactual interest rate uncertainty will always decrease moving from quarterly to daily projection updates; however, the consequences for the counterfactual interest rate volatility of moving to the other extreme case of providing no projections are not obvious. On the one hand, interest rate uncertainty may increase because the volatilitydampening effect of fresh projections no longer applies, i.e. τ t ≡ 1. On the other hand, however, the potential volatility-increasing effect of stale projections (as reflected in large values of | f j − p j |) also disappears. Therefore, interest rate projections can guide market expectations and decrease interest rate volatility only as long as the central bank ensures that projections do not become too stale. Looking at the counterfactual standard deviations of the no-projection scenario presented in Row 3 of Table 3 shows that the empirical performance of the RBNZ's quarterly projections is very different before and during the crisis. In the pre-crisis period, counterfactual standard deviations of the no-projection scenario are lower than the estimated standard deviations. This suggests that the RBNZ's quarterly projections were often too stale in the pre-crisis period. Apparently, the deviations of futures rates from the corresponding projection were too large and thus contributed to even more interest rate uncertainty. In contrast, the volatility-decreasing effects of quarterly projections dominate in the crisis period.
For all horizons, the estimated standard deviations for quarterly projections are lower than their counterfactual counterparts obtained for the no-projection scenario. Interestingly, the volatility-decreasing effects of the RBNZ's projections become larger the shorter the projection horizon. This may suggest that forward guidance is more effective for short horizons.
Rows 4 and 5 of Table 3 show the counterfactual standard deviations of two variants of a more flexible, state-dependent implementation scheme for central bank interest rate projections. In these scenarios, the central bank updates its projection whenever the market perceives the current projection as being stale, i.e. whenever | f j − p j | exceeds a certain threshold S. In practice, this can be accomplished by adjusting the projection to market expectations (if market expectations are correct) or by confirming the current projection (if market expectations are wrong). Since the deviations of futures rates from the corresponding projections are significantly larger, the volatility dampening effects of thresholds can be expected to be more pronounced in the crisis period (cf. Table 1 ).
The counterfactual analysis confirms that interest rate volatility would have been significantly lower if projections had been issued more flexibly during the crisis period.
Even for a large threshold (S = 25), interest rate volatility decreases remarkably, implying volatility gains close to the first best scenario of daily projections. By contrast, in the pre-crisis period, the introduction of only a small threshold of 12.5 bp has a signif- (1 − τ t )
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